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NOTE AND COMMENT
THE DOCTRINE OF RELATION BACK IN
MONTANA WATER LAW
General Sherman, commenting on the gold that was dis-
covered at Sutter's Mill, California, in 1848, wrote, "That gold
was the first discovered in the Sierra Nevadas which soon revolu-
tionized the whole country and actually moved the whole civil-
ized world. "' Perhaps General Sherman was over zealous in
his appraisal of that gold rush, but it is apparent that the sud-
den influx of early settlers to California did affect the develop-
ment of our western states in many respects, not the least of
which is the effect it had on the development of our modern
mining and water law.
In a recent case' the Supreme Court of Montana had before
it a factual situation wherein defendant William Armington,
through his predecessors, secured a right to the use of thirty
cubic feet per second of time of the waters of Tallow Creek in
Phillips County, Montana. The appropriations therefor had
been made in 1903 and 1913. The diversion was made by means
of one ditch, described in the original notice as being "four feet
wide on bottom, five feet wide on top, and one foot deep." In
1919 plaintiff B. H. Clausen's predecessors secured a homestead
patent embracing the public land upon which defendant's ap-
propriation had been made. In 1939 plaintiff filed notice of
appropriation of all the waters of Tallow creek in excess of those
already appropriated by defendant. However, at this time no
appreciable amount of water was obtainable, for defendant's
ditch had eroded to such an extent that it. was diverting all the
waters of Tallow Creek. Other than filing notice, plaintiff
made no affirmative act to secure water under his "appropria-
tion" until 1941, at which time he obtained the permission of
defendant's predecessor to erect a dam and install a pipe capable
of diverting thirty cubic feet per second of time, placed in such
manner that no water would go over the dam onto plaintiff's
land until thirty cubic feet had been diverted through the pipe.
This was accomplished in 1942, and for the first time plaintiff
received an appreciable amount of water which he beneficially
used, and continued to do so until 1945, when defendant, over
plaintiff's objection, removed the pipe and dam, leaving a ditch
which measured twenty-six feet, six inches across the top, nine
feet, six inches across the bottom, and four feet, seven inches
deep.
1
WIEIz WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES (3d ed. 1911) § 70 p. 71.
For a history of the doctrine of appropriation see chapter V.2Clausen v. Armington (1949) ...... Mont........ 212 P. (2d) 440.
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Action was brought by B. H. Clausen to compel William
Armington to construct a headgate, and to enjoin him from so
using his ditch as to interfere with plaintiff's beneficial use of
the surplus water to which plaintiff claims he is entitled for ir-
rigating his land.
In deciding the issues, the Court limited the defendant's
right of appropriation to the amount of water that he could
beneficially use. Said the court:
".. . it is manifest that defendants appropriation of
thirty cubic feet per second or 1,200 miners inches was
more than the amount necessary to irrigate '300 or 400
acres' and that defendant therefore has no occasion for a
larger ditch than is specified and stated in the above no-
tices of appropriation. .... "
Defendant contended that because plaintiff did not within
forty days of posting notice "proceed to prosecute the excava-
tion or construction of the work by which the water to be ap-
propriated is to be diverted," he did not make an appropriation.
In this regard the court said:
"However, a person may make a valid appropriation of
.water by actual diversion and use thereof without filing
a notice of appropriation.
Further:
"Not having constructed a ditch from Tallow Creek
within a reasonable time after November 15, 1939, the date
of his notice of appropriation, plaintiff's appropriation
would not ... relate back to that date, but . . would date
from the spring of 1942 when he directed the water onto
his land and continued to do so in 1943, 1944, and 1945,
before defendant in the fall of 1945, removed the pipe and
and dam from his ditch, so as to prevent any further use
of the water by plaintiff."
In reaching the decision above, the court considered three
fundamental propositions: (1) To secure an appropriation there
must be a completed ditch, (2) there must be a beneficial use
for the water diverted, and (3) the water must be actually di-
verted from the stream. These fundamentals are not new with
the courts. They extend back into the earliest decisions, and
beyond. At the time of their inception there were no courts,
and few lawyers. The laws, made by the miners themselves at
their periodical meetings, were born of necessity, and framed
to secure the desired practical results in a world which was
guided by the basic doctrine of first come, first served. In order
2
Montana Law Review, Vol. 12 [1951], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol12/iss1/8
NOTE AND COMMENT
to acquire a possession it was necessary that it be claimed before
anyone else claimed it. The miner who first staked out a mining
claim became the owner--so too, the appropriator' who first di-
verted and applied water to a beneficial use secured a right
which was superior to that of a subsequent appropriator.' As
the business of life grew more complicated and appropriations of
water were made in greater numbers this basic doctrine proved
inadequate to serve the ends of justice in all respects. Often-
times it worked a hardship on appropriators, particularily those
whose construction embraced a large amount of work. In Con-
ger v. Weaver,5 the California Supreme Court, in recognizing
this hardship, said:
"But from the nature of these works it is evident that it
requires time to complete them, and from their extent in
some instances, it would require much time; and the ques-
tion now arises, at what point of time does the right com-
mence, so as to protect the undertaker from the subsequent
settlements or enterprises of other persons. If it does not
commence until the canal is completed, then the license is
valueless, for after nearly the whole work has been done
any one actuated by malice or self-interest may prevent
its accomplishment; any small squatter settlement might
effectually destroy it."
At the time that this case was decided, a doctrine of- rela-
tion back was being applied by the courts in cases pertaining to
possessory interests in land and estates.' The California court
commended this doctrine and held that in cases where ownership
of the water was not based upon ownership of the land through
which the water flows,' possession or actual appropriation of the
water was the test of priority in any claim to the use of the wa-
ter.' Consequently, said the court, a similar doctrine would be
properly applied to those cases involving ownership of water. In
applying the doctrine of relation back to the law of appropria-
tions for the first time, the court said:'
"Possession and acts of ownership are the usual indica-
tions of a right of property, and they must be judged ac-
'The word "appropriator" will be used throughout this article to indi-
cate a person who commences an appropriation, whether or not he
actually completes it.
'Eddy v. Simpson (1853) 3 Cal. 249.
'(1856) 6 Cal. 548.
°Stark v. Barnes (1854) 4 Cal. 548.
'Irwin v. Phillips (1885) 5 Cal. 140, 142, in which the court held that
there was no law or reason for holding the use of the water exclusive-
ly to the person who owned the land over which it flowed.
'Kelly v. Natoma Water Co. (1856) 6 Cal. 105; Maeris v. Bicknell
(1857) 7 Cal. 262, 68 Am. Dec. 257.
'Conger v. Weaver (1856) 6 Cal. 548.
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cording to the nature of the subject matter ... so in the
case of constructing canals, under the license from the
state, the survey of the ground, planting stakes along the
line, and actually commencing and diligently pursuing the
work, is as much possession as the nature of the subject
will admit, and forms a series of acts of ownership which
must be conclusive of the right."
Today, this doctrine of relation back is found, in some form or
other, in the statutes or decisions of every western state.' In
1871, Mr. Justice Murphy, speaking for the Montana Supreme
Court, adopted the doctrine and added that during the period
between commencement and completion of the work, the appro-
priator was not bound to take notice of intervenors, nor was he
bound to give them notice that waste water was to be reclaimed."
In Murray v. Tingley," the court in applying the doctrine, said:
"Under the doctrine of 'relation back' as between two per-
sons digging ditches at the same time, and prosecuting
work thereon with reasonable diligence to completion, the
one who first began work had the prior right, even though
the other had completed his first. This was the doctrine
of relation back."'
As noted above, the essential elements of an appropriation
were a completed ditch, an actual diversion of the water, and an
application of the water to a beneficial use. Before the doctrine
of relation back applied, it was necessary that these requirements
be met. Until they were, the appropriator did not receive a
vested right, but upon completion of his work he received a right
which related back to the time of commencement of his work.
Thus, such preliminary work as surveying the ground, clearing
brush, planting stakes, etc., served as notice to a subsequent, rival
claimant, that even though he should succeed in completing his
ditch first, his claim would be subordinate to the claim of the
appropriator who commenced his ditch first and pursued his
work with reasonable diligence to completion."
The problem of establishing proof of priority was often ac-
'WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES (3d ed. 1911).
'Woolman v. Garringer (1871) 1 Mont. 535.
"(1897) 20 Mont. 260, 50 P. 723.
uUnder the doctrine of relation back the one who commenced work first
got the prior right, even though the other completed his ditch first.
Wright v. Cruse (1908) 37 Mont. 177, 95 P. 370.
'Murray v. Tingley (1897) 20 Mont. 260, 50 P. 723; Anaconda National
Bank v. Johnson et al. (1926) 75 Mont. 401, 244 P. 141; Gates v. Set-
tlers' Co. (1907) 19 Okla. 83, 91 P. 856.
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companied by much confusion and conflicting testimony.' The
courts had to depend almost entirely on the oral testimony of
witnesses, whose memory, often-times, had become clouded by
lapse of time. To obviate this as much as possible, many State
Legislatures passed statutes requiring notices of appropriation
to be filed. These notices provided concrete evidence of the date
of commencing work, as well as regulating the manner of mak-
ing an appropriation.
In 1885, the Montana Legislature passed an act' which pro-
vided that any person desiring to secure an appropriation of wa-
ter, must post a notice at the point of diversion. This notice must
contain a statement of: -the quantity of water claimed, the pur-
pose for which it was to be used, the means of diversion, the date,
and the name of the appropriator. Within twenty days of post-
ing the notice, it was required to be filed with the county clerk
of the county in which the appropriation was to be made." In
addition, within forty days of posting notice the appropriator
must proceed with his work, and complete it with reasonable
diligence.'
If these provisions were to be construed alone, it would be
apparent that the Legislature intended to allow only appropria-
tions which were secured in compliance therewith, but the Leg-
islature did not stop there. A further enactment" entitled EF-
FECT OF FAILURE provides:
"A failure to comply with the provisions of this chapter
deprives the appropriator of the right to the use of the
water as against a subsequent claimant who complies
therewith, but by complying with the provisions of this
chapter the right to the use of water shall relate back to
the date of posting the notice."
The Supreme Court of California, construing a statute similar'
to the Montana provision, said:'
"In this provision we begin to see the purpose and object
of the legislature, which in our opinion was merely to
"See Murray v. Tingley (1897) 20 Mont. 260, 268, 50 P. 723, 724.
2 Chapters 6, 7, and 8, Laws of Montana 1885, entitled "An act relating
to Water Rights." This act has been carried through the codes and
is set out today in essentially the same form. R.C.M. 1947 §§ 89-810,
89-811, and 89-812.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 89-810 (7100).2 R.C.M. 1947, § 89-811 (7101).
*R.C.M. 1947, § 89-812 (7102).
2The word "appropriator" is not susceptible of any greater or narrower
force than the word "claimant," therefore no distinction can be drawn
between the California Act and that of Montana. Murray v. Tingley
supra, note 14.
"De Necochea v. Curtis (1889) 80 Cal. 397, 20 P. 563.
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define with precision the conditions upon which the ap-
propriator of water could have the advantage of the
familiar doctrine of relation."
In Welles v. Mantes,' the court held that the only effect of the
code provision was to "establish a procedure" for the determi-
nation of a precise time in acquisition of title.
In Montana, Mr. Justice Buck, after referring to the Cali-
fornia code provisions, and the interpretation given them by the
court, said :'
"We think the construction of the statute by the Supreme
Court of California is logical and correct, and are of the
opinion that the Montana act should be construed in the
same manner. The Montana legislature, in the enact-
ment of said water-right act, intended to regulate the
doctrine of 'relation back'."
As a result of this construction, an appropriator today may
proceed under either of two separate and distinct methods. He
may: (1) proceed without regard to the statutes, in which case
he must fulfill the requirements of the original method of ap-
propriation, namely, a completed ditch, diversion of the water,
and an actual application of the water to a beneficial use. By
proceeding in this manner he will not secure the benefit of the
doctrine of relation back. His right will date as of the time of
actual application of the water to a beneficial use. Or he may:
(2) proceed according to the terms of the statute, in which
case he must post a notice, begin work within forty days, and
complete his ditch with reasonable diligence.
If the appropriator proceeds under the statute, and com-
pletes his work with reasonable diligence, it is not necessary that
he actually divert and use the water.' Upon completion of his
ditch, or other means of diversion, he acquires a right which re-
lates back to the date of posting notice.
Thus, the act of 1885, which is carried forward into our
present statutes, limited the doctrine of relation back to those
who comply therewith, and changed the original doctrine in two
respects. (1) It changed the time at which the right vests by
relation back; prior to the act, the right related back to the
date of commencing work, but since the codes, the right relates
back to the time of posting notice. (2) It changed the amount
of work that need be done before the doctrine applies; prior to
"(1893) 99 Cal. 583, 34 P. 324.
2'Murray v. Tingley (1897) supra, note 14.
"Bailey v. Tintinger (1912) 45 Mont. 154, 122 P. 575.
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the act it was necessary that there be an actual diversion, and an
application of the water to a beneficial use. Today, however, by
compliance with the statute, the final act necessary to secure
the benefits of relation back is completion of the ditch. There
need be no immediate application of the water to a beneficial
use, but there must be an intention to use it within a reasonable
time.
On this point the states are in conflict. Many states, in-
cluding Colorado, hold that an actual application of the water
to a beneficial use is an essential element of a valid appropria-
tion.' It is ruled in Colorado that application of the water to
a beneficial use is a condition precedent to the creation of the
right, and not a condition subsequent. Under the Colorado
theory, a consumer who takes from a public service ditch com-
pany is the actual appropriator. Montana courts do not follow
the Colorado doctrine.' Said the court in Baily v. Tintinger :3T
"To deny the right of a public service corporation to make
an appropriation independently of its present or future
customers, and to have a definite time fixed at which its
right attaches, would be to discaurage the formation of
such corporations and greatly retard the reclamation of
arid lands in localties where the magnitude of the under-
taking is too great for individual enterprise, if, indeed, it
would not defeat the object and purpose of the United
States-in its great reclamation projects, for the United
States must proceed in making appropriation of water
(from the nonnavigable streams of this state at least) as
a corporation or individual.'
'Wheeler v. Northern Irrigation Co. (1888) 10 Colo. 582, 17 P. 487, 3
Am. St. Rep. 603; Park v. Park (1909) 45 Colo. 356, 101 P. 406. "The
final step, and the most essential element, to constitute a completed
valid appropriation of water, is the application of it to a beneficial
purpose. Whatever else is required to be or is done, until the actual
application of the water is made for a beneficial purpose, no valid
appropriation has been effected." Sowards v. Meagher (1910) 37 Utah
212, 108 P. 1113. The same result was reached in Hagerman Co. v.
McMurray (1911) 16 N. M. 172, 113 P. 823.
2California and Oregon are in accord with Montana. In Nevada Ditch
Co. v. Bennett, (1896) 30 Ore. 59, 45 P. 472, 60 Am. St. Rep. 777 it was
held that the intent to hold the water for sale to third persons was a
beneficial use, and that application to the specific ultimate use was
not a condition precedent to an appropriation. Likewise, in California
it is held that "By completion is meant conducting the waters to the
place of intended use" without necessarily applying the water to actual
use. California Civil Code § 1417.
"Supra, note 24.2 SSee also United States v. Burley (1909) 172 F. 615 Burley v. United
States (1910) 179 F. 1, 102 C.C.A. 429.
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The court said further:
"It is clearly the public policy of this state to encourage
these public services corporations in their irrigation enter-
prises, and the courts should be reluctant to reach a con-
clusion which would militate against that policy."
It was ruled by the court that the statutes provided a complete
method of appropriating water, and that, when a public service
corporation, or the United States Government complied with
the statute and had its ditch or distributing system completed,
and stood ready to deliver water to users upon demand, its ap-
propriation was complete. To hold otherwise would be to hold
the actual appropriation in abeyance, possibly for several years,
during which time it would be impossible to determine the final
rights of rival claimants.
Before completion of his ditch, even though he may proceed
with reasonable diligence, an appropriator does not secure a
vested right to the water. By posting notice at the point of
diversion, he merely serves notice on intervenors that he intends
to appropriate a certain amount of water, and that upon com-
pletion of his ditch with reasonable diligence, his right will re-
late back to the date of posting notice.' He has no cause of
action against intervenors who use the water prior to comple-
tion of his work, unless they unlawfully interfere with his work.
During the period of construction, however, he may use as much
of the water as is necessary to his work, or as much as he needs
to keep his ditches in repair.'
As between two rival claimants, both of whom have posted
notice and completed their ditch with reasonable diligence, prior-
ity is in the one who posted first. By completing their ditches
with reasonable diligence, both claimants secure the benefits of
relation, which relates their rights back to the posting of notice.
Under the doctrine of first in time, first in right, the one who
posted his notice first prevails.
Substantially the same result would have been reached be-
fore the codes. Upon completion of the ditch with reasonable
diligence, and a beneficial use, the rights would have related
back to the commencement of the work. Since the statutory
regulations, however, the doe.trine of relation back will not ap-
ply to an appropriator who does not comply therewith.
Woolman v. Garringer (1871) 1 Mont. 535; Miles v. Butte Electric
Power Co. (1905) 32 Mont. 56, 79 P. 549; Nevada County and. Sacra-
mento Canal Company v. Kidd (1869) 37 Cal. 282.
'Weaver v. Conger (1858) 10 Cal. 233, 6 Morr. Min. Rep. 203.
8
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An appropriator who proceeds without notice can secure no
right against a rival claimant who does post notice before be-
ginning his work. A failure to post notice amounts to a waiver
of the right of relation back.' By beginning without notice an
appropriator, in order to secure a completed appropriation, must
fulfill the essentials of the original method. He must have: (A)
a completed ditch, (B) an actual diversion of the water, and
(C) a beneficial use. Upon fulfillment of these requirements,
he will get a right as of the date of diversion and beneficial use.
It is apparent that by commencing subsequent to a rival who
posts notice he will acquire no prior rights, for the rival claim-
ant who posts notice and completes his ditch with reasonable
diligence will by relation back, get a right as of the date of post-
ing notice.
It follows that a failure to post notice is not in all cases
fatal. If the appropriator who posts notice should : (A) fail to
file his notice, (B) file a defective notice, or (C) fail to prose-
cute his work with diligence as prescribed by statute, he loses
the benefit of the doctrine of relation and it becomes a race of
diligence between the parties to get the water diverted and ap-
plied to a beneficial use. The one first diverting and beneficial-
ly using will, in this case, prevail.
As between two claimants, neither of whom post notice, the
one who actually diverts, and beneficially uses water will pre-
vail. Prior to the act of 1885, the one who commenced first
would win. No matter who completed his ditch first, the prior-
ity would be in the one who first gave notice by commencing
work. This, of course, was dependent on his completion with
reasonable diligence, and was the result of the doctrine of rela-
tion back giving him a right as of the time of commencement.
Today, however, the doctrine of relation back is regulated by
the codes, and it can not be applied unless notice is posted, and
the statutes are complied with.
Respectable authority can be found holding contra to this
result. In Nevada Ditch Co. v. Bennet," the Oregon court said:
"Either by statute, or custom so well recognized as to
have the effect of a statute, it is usual for persons intend-
ing to appropriate the waters . . . to give warning by
8 Murray v. Tingley, supra note 15; Bailey v. Tintinger, supra note 24;
Waters, 67 C.J. p. 1011.
"Supra, note 26. In accord: Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. Hempe (1915)
226 F. 1012; Miocene Ditch Co. v. Jacobsen (1906) 146 F. 680, 682,
77 C.C.A. 106; Hough v. Porter (1908) 51 Ore. 318, 427, 95 P. 732,
98 P. 1083, 1087, 102 P. 728; Whited v. Caven (1909) 55 Ore. 98, 104,
105 P. 396.
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posting . . . a notice .... If notice is not provided for by
statute, or if provided for, is not given, the title of the
appropriator by relation, must be regarded as commenc-
ing at the time when he began his dam, ditch, flume, or
other appliance."
The court holds that statutes similar to ours afford protection
to the appropriator only if he choose to take advantage of them.
If he does not choose to take advantage of them, then the hold-
ing is the same as if they had never been enacted, and the same
line of reasoning is applied as was applied before the code, i.e.,
the first person to commence work in such manner as to give
notice of his intended appropriation secures, upon completion
of his work with reasonable diligence, a right which relates back
to the commencement of his work.
This rule is not adopted in Montana. Mr. Justice Buck,
in Murray v. Tingley,' where neither party had posted a notice
which satisfied the statutory requirements, expressed the Mon-
tana opinion, saying:
"Neither complied with the statute, but as between
Charles Murray and the defendant appellants, the right
of defendant appellants is a superior one. The latter had
their ditch completed, and water flowing over their land,
a year before the former did. Defendant appellants and
Charles Murray both acquired valid water rights, despite
a noncompliance with the statute; but the right of de-
fendants is superior to that of Charles Murray, although
he commenced work on his ditch first."
Mr. Chief Justice Callaway in a situation wherein an appropria-
tion notice was filed in 1902, and an actual application to ben-
eficial use was made in 1916, said:
". .. but the evidence is not sufficient to apply to it the
doctrine of relation back. It seems to us after a careful
consideration of the evidence, that the right must date
from 1916, when the water was put to a beneficial use."
Again in 1929 the Supreme Court of Montana, in a case in which
the notice was not entitled to be recorded because of faulty
verification, held that the doctrine of relation did not apply, and
that the right to water took effect as of the time of actual di-
version and beneficial use." The same result is reached in the
principal case, Clausen v. Armington, supra.
8Supra, note 15.
"Musselshell Valley Farming and Livestock Co. v. Cooley (1929) 86
Mont. 276, 283 P. 213.
10
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Thus, in Montana, compliance with the statute is a condi-
tion precedent to application of the doctrine of relation back.
A failure to comply does not render a completed appropriation
invalid. It does, however, date the acquired right as of the
date of actual application of the water to a beneficial use. In
order to secure the benefit of relation back, it is necessary to
comply with the provisions of the statute, for a failure to com-
ply therewith amounts to a waiver of the doctrine of relation.
JAMES HECKATHORN.
VARIANCE AND FAILURE OF PROOF IN MONTANA
In Montana, and in code states generally, there are three
recognized degrees of deviation between pleading and proof.
They are in the order of their seriousness, immaterial variance,
material variance, and failure of proof. Material variance is de-
fined as any variance which "has actually misled the adverse
party to his prejudice in maintaining his action or defense upon
the merits," 1 and when such variance occurs the court may
order the pleadings to be amended upon such terms as may be
just. A variance which does not so mislead the adverse party
is deemed immaterial, and the court may direct the fact to be
found according to the evidence, or may order an immediate
amendment without costs.' A failure of proof arises where the
allegation of the claim or defense is unproved, not in some par-
ticular or particulars only, but in its general scope and mean-
ing.'
There is a well defined distinction between material and
immaterial variance. Formal, technical or slight variances will
be considered immaterial and either disregarded or amended
by the court's order.' Material variances must be objected to,
and before a variance will be treated as material the injured
party must show to the court's satisfaction that he has actual-
ly been misled and in what particulars. If the objection is not
made, the point is waived and the pleading will be held to be
amended to conform to the proof, if necessary, on appeal.'
There is more difficulty in marking the line between vari-
1R.C.M. 1947, § 93-3901 (9183).
2R.C.M. 1947, § 93-3902 (9184).
'R.C.M. 1947, § 93-3903 (9185).
'Baker v. Briscoe (1888) 8 Mont. 214, 19 P. 589.
'Wilcox v. Newman (1920) 58 Mont. 54, 190 P. 138.
'Mosher v. Sutton's New Theatre Co. (1913) 48 Mont. 137, 137 P. 534.
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